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Abstract Over the last decade, the dramatic increase in the number of young people 
diverted from formal processing through the youth justice system in England and Wales, and the 
equally sharp drop in the rate of youth custody, suggest that the neoliberal formula for the penal 
governance of young people who offend has been undergoing significant reshaping.  This article 
draws on research which interrogates the changes that are currently taking place, particularly the 
proliferation of “out of court” community-based measures of diversion and offence resolution, to 
develop a more fine-tuned conceptualization of the complexities of neoliberal youth penality. We 
base our findings principally on England and Wales, although it is likely that our analysis is 
applicable in other settings. With the extensive reduction in the capacity of the state to exert 
direct measures of institutional and community-based coercion, we seek to identify other, less 
overt processes that also aspire to maintain order and reproduce social relations favorable to the 
neoliberal project. In lieu of ending on a purely pessimistic note, we conclude with a brief outline 
of the potential for alternative, progressive strategies that seek to challenge rather than simply 
modify or incorporate previous modes of regulation and control.  
 
Introduction: Diversion and a Shift in “Sites” and “Logics” of Governance 
“Climate” refers to the background configuration of forces and conditions that are sustained over 
time; day-to-day events constitute “the weather.” It is the latter that tends to occupy our interest 
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and concern and indeed impacts on us most directly, but it is the former that is more influential 
and, indeed, sets the rules by which the latter must operate. We hope that it is not too much of a 
stretch to suggest that this works well as an analogy for the changing contexts and experiences of 
what we now know as “youth justice.” This is very much the terrain we wish to explore in this 
article, with particular reference to “diversion”3 and the way in which decisions at the “front 
end” of the justice system are shaped by policy interests, coordinating bodies and delivery 
agencies, and then made and instituted by practitioners. 
 When reflecting on the history of diversion in youth justice, our attention is first captured 
by the rapid and dramatic changes suggested by the official figures at particular periods of time 
(Smith 2017). So, for instance, there appears to have been something of a pendulum effect, with 
a substantial increase in the number of young people prosecuted from 1991 onwards, set against 
a relative decline in cautioning or informal warnings from the police as an alternative to an 
appearance in court. Later, an 85 per cent decrease in the number of “first time entrants”4 to the 
youth justice system was recorded between March 2007 and March 2017 (Ministry of Justice 
2018). The net effect of these changes has been, on the face of it, a substantial decriminalization 
of a large section of the population of children and young people in England and Wales over this 
latter period, which constitutes a de facto reversal of previous policy on dealing with youth 
crime.  
At first sight, this suggests a significant degree of volatility in official circles in ideas 
about how young offenders should be treated. In other words, prevailing conceptualizations of 
young people and their (problematic) behavior may, on this evidence, be viewed as reasonably 
fluid and susceptible to short-term contingent influences. The extent to which young people in 
general are perceived as representing an existential threat to community stability and social order 
seems to be a matter of continual recalibration and revision, according to this line of reasoning. 
Upon further reflection, however, this seems to sit somewhat oddly with prevailing and well-
established assumptions about childhood and its key characteristics, as well as “risk” and how 
that is constituted and made manageable. We can see from recent contributions from 
neuroscience, for instance, that our understanding of childhood and adolescent development and 
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maturation are improving, rather than being called into question. Thus increasingly, childhood is 
being identified as a life-phase characterized by a process of physiological and psychological 
development, during which the capacity to make rational judgments and exercise self-control is 
acquired only gradually on the journey to full maturity. A body of literature that seeks to 
establish a range of predispositional factors that are “associated with” anti-social and criminal 
behavior (see Case and Haines 2009; Smith 2011) supports this evidence.  
 According to this explanatory framework of child development, risk assessment thus has 
a legitimate and continuing part to play in establishing the extent to which specific children are 
or are not following the expected (and normatively determined) path towards responsible 
adulthood. The problem to be addressed here is how such fairly authoritative narratives and 
justificatory accounts have adapted to, or have even been foundational to, the changing shape of 
practice in youth justice, in general, and the substantial reduction in the level of formal 
processing of young people for offences, in particular. Whatever its origins, the changing shape 
of practice at the front end of the justice system has wider implications for the ways in which 
young people’s deviant behavior is understood. The shift from an approach grounded in actuarial 
calculations of risk (Smith 2006) and micro-management of behavior to one which, by and large, 
appears to be indifferent to the “early” signs of delinquency, is striking, and must, one would 
expect, be supported by some kind of rationale, beyond simply a need to cut costs (Bateman 
2017). 
 Here, then, we suggest that the example of diversion might provide a case study for an 
exploration of the changing rationalities of youth justice in a changing and increasingly 
neoliberal economic climate. Typically, in the context of youth justice in England and Wales, the 
idea of diversion has been associated with decisions and actions taking place in the pre-court 
phase of the justice process—measures associated with minimizing intervention in cases of 
relatively minor or uncontroversial offences. In this respect, the youthfulness and supposed 
immaturity of those involved in the offending behavior is a relevant consideration. Children are 
considered to be inherently less responsible and less accountable than adults and, therefore, 
eligible for a less punitive form of intervention. Although, on the face of it, this provides a 
straightforward, even common-sense rationale for not invoking the full force of the legal process, 
it also leads inevitably to the question of why this process should be susceptible to the dramatic 
and rapid changes in practice outlined above.  
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 At the level of practice, we have observed the replacement of “formal” interventions 
(such as prosecutions) with what appears to be a significant increase in police-initiated informal 
actions—in the form of community disposals or referrals to diversionary panels and programs at 
arm’s length from the justice system. At first glance, recent developments suggest quite a 
disparate pattern of practices in youth diversion, captured explicitly by Kelly and Armitage’s 
(2015) phrase, “diverse diversions.” The emergence of a range of approaches is reflected in their 
study of two different sites, where, alternatively “restorative” and “welfare-led” diversionary 
interventions appear to prevail; and this is supplemented by evidence of minimum intervention 
and “offender management” strategies (Smith 2017), which seem to prioritize efficiency and 
simplicity at the expense of more considered strategies. Here, then, we might speculate that it is 
difficult to determine any degree of coherence in the thinking that underpins these ostensibly 
very different approaches, where the dominant themes appear to be captured in the notions of 
pragmatism and localism. 
 Overall the diverse conceptualizations of diversion currently in vogue in England and 
Wales suggest a lack of clarity and a degree of murkiness about the prevailing intervention logic 
that underlies youth justice policy and practice. Such local adaptations suggest a degree of 
“relative autonomy” (Poulantzas 1974) in applying legal and regulatory mandates. Policy driven 
outcome measures and success criteria, however, remain constant and these are perhaps 
indicative of common ground and a point of convergence at the level of diversionary practice. 
This leads us to speculate that new style diversion may coalesce around a move away from 
coercion towards cheaper and less direct mechanisms for promoting conformity and asserting 
“soft” control. The remainder of this article is divided into three main sections. The first explores 
the way in which thinking about young people who offend has changed in recent years and the 
impact of these changes on diversionary policy and practice. The second focuses on how the new 
style diversion informs our understanding of the dynamics of neoliberal penality in action.  The 
final section seeks to challenge the stranglehold of dystopian accounts of diversion to consider 







Redrawing the Boundaries, Redefining the “Field” 
Over the last two decades, the scope of criminological research on the sociology of punishment 
has expanded dramatically and increasingly, attention has been drawn away from universalizing, 
grand narratives about the state’s role in manufacturing penality to focus on “more fine-grained” 
and “detailed, action- level accounts” (Garland 2018: 13–14).  Hence, Wacquant’s (2009) 
depiction of neoliberal statecraft, whereby repressive, penal measures, particularly 
imprisonment, are used to manage the high levels of social inequality created by its contentious 
economic strategies, does little to capture the nuances of youth penality in action, where there 
has been a significant drop in both the number of young people appearing in court and entering 
custody. From 2007-17, there was a 79% decline in the number of children and young people 
arrested for indictable offences in England and Wales, a 72% drop in the number proceeded 
against in court, a 75% fall in the number of “proven offences” committed by children and young 
people (Ministry of Justice 2018: 6–7 and 20). The consequential decline in the numbers entering 
custody is of a similar scale, with an average of “just under 870” children or young people 
locked up in March 2017, compared to an average of approximately 2,900 at the same point ten 
years previously (Ministry of Justice 2018: 31).  
 We should note at this point, though, that these aggregate figures do disguise an 
increasing concentration of young, black5 people at every stage in the justice process, with the 
proportion locked up by March 2017 two-and-a -half times more than would be expected from 
the general population figures (Ministry of Justice 2018: 34).  These trends originate at the door 
to the justice system with young, black people less likely to be diverted from the justice 
system—attributable in part to the lack of trust they place in a system that they experience as 
endemically oppressive (Sabbagh 2017).  A “slimming-down” of youth justice (Bateman 2017: 
4) also appears to have been happening in the United States (US) with decreases in both the rates 
of arrest and custody except for young, black people (Goshe 2015, 2018). Here, too, Wacquant’s 
(2009) analysis of the penal state on the one hand fails to theorize the current complexities of 
youth justice, while, on the other, his comments on the racialization of criminal justice do carry 
weight.  We will return to this issue later in the article. 
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 The “diversionary impulse” evidenced in the previous section suggests that the neoliberal 
formula for the penal governance of young people who offend has been reshaped.  The new 
penal landscape combines a hybrid mix of “risk” and “need” logics to create a disparate 
repertoire of interdependent penal-welfare measures, which enact what McAra (2017a: 772) 
conceptualizes as “compassionate” and Gray (2013: 530) as “therapeutic” penal governance.   
The latter, as Hannah-Moffat and Maurutto (2012: 202) argue, distorts widely held notions of the 
“parameters of punishment” and, in so doing, extends the possibilities for social regulation.  To 
appreciate the dynamics of this new blueprint in action, it is useful to explore how the 
problematization of young people who offend and the constitution of “effective practice” have 
been reformulated to support the recent proliferation of diversionary programs that have 
appeared on the youth justice scene. 
 
The Rediscovery of Welfare Thinking? 
The rise to prominence of diversionary programs not only reflects changes in the core sites of 
targeted penal governance, but also signals variations in the rationalities for the social regulation 
of young people who offend.  The fulcrum of diversionary programs is the decision-making 
forums in which it is decided what type of scheme young people will join.  The official 
guidelines (Ministry of Justice 2013: 16) simply state, “there is no ‘prescription’ on how this 
should be done, and it should be based on the structures best suited to the local area.”  In 
response to this, a diverse set of arrangements have emerged throughout England and Wales to 
facilitate joint decision-making with representation from at least the police and youth offending 
teams (YOTs), although in some areas, other social service providers may also be involved.  The 
inspection of out-of-court disposals (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection 2017: 49) found that three-
quarters of the teams they reviewed had such arrangements in place. 
 The Youth Justice Board recommends that all decisions about out-of-court disposals 
should be preceded by a full assessment, preferably using one of their risk assessment 
instruments (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection 2017).6  In recent years, this has changed from 
Asset to Asset Plus and the differences between the two assessment tools illustrate the shift in 
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thinking that now shapes the governance of young people who offend7.  Asset, underpinned by 
Farrington’s (2000) “risk factor prevention paradigm” (RFPP), was the key assessment tool of 
the Labour government’s (1997-2010) flagship youth justice legislation, which set out to identify 
the individual and social factors that increased young people’s risk of offending and advocated 
early intervention to “nip offending in the bud” (Case and Haines 2009; Turnbull and Spence 
2011).  In this process, young people’s social welfare difficulties became viewed as 
pathological—individual deficits in need of correction to avoid the likelihood of offending.  The 
conflation of “need” and “risk” in this way, coupled with the focus on early intervention, 
legitimized excessive criminalization, as increasing numbers of young people who offended were 
sucked into the youth justice system, subjected to more intrusive forms of correctional 
interventions and hastily driven towards custody (Goldson 2010). 
 The rationalities that inform the current “diversionary impulse” are different from those 
of their predecessors.  While Asset was informed by the RFPP, Asset Plus is guided by a new 
“regime of truth” (Foucault 1980)—namely desistance theory and research (Youth Justice Board 
2016a).  The desistance paradigm focuses on why people stop offending and while the policy and 
practice  developed from it mainly relates  to adult offenders, in this new era, it has been applied 
to interventions with young offenders.  This new application of the desistance paradigm reflects 
a return once again to a welfarist mindset as the focus of “child-centered” desistance policy and 
practice  is on addressing “the needs of the whole child, not just those needs most directly linked 
to offending behaviour” (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection 2017: 6).  This way of thinking 
becomes even more poignant as official documents repeatedly point out that the dramatic drop in 
‘first time entrants’ has meant that those young people remaining under the orbit of the youth 
justice system have exceptionally complex welfare problems which require intensive therapeutic 
intervention (Taylor 2016).  The overarching difference in thinking, however, is that while the 
RFPP which guided Asset focused on deficits, the desistance focus in Asset Plus places the 
spotlight on the “foundations for change” by building on young people’s strengths, motivation 
and resilience to stop offending (HMI Probation 2016; Youth Justice Board 2016a). Asset Plus 
“is designed to be scalable to individual case circumstances” (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection 
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way of thinking underlies all such tools. 
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2017: 37) in the context of out-of-court disposals, although in practice, some YOTs have found it 
“too onerous” in this context. Asset Plus is thus identified as the frame of reference by which the 
influential inspectorate judges the adequacy of formal assessment practices in the context of 
diversion. 
 While Asset Plus is heavily dependent on desistance thinking, it remains primarily an 
offense-focused tool. Hampson’s (2018: 30) study suggests that Asset Plus has been of only 
limited effectiveness in terms of shifting the focus of assessments away from risk and towards 
“desistance” based models of intervention. This suggests that inspections of practice have 
themselves sent “mixed messages” to practitioners: “how can they pursue a desistance-based 
agenda if the criteria upon which they will be judged by the inspectorate is still (for general 
inspections) firmly risk-focused?” This is underlined by the prominence given to offense-related 
factors, such as the seriousness and circumstances of the offense and the young person’s 
offending history, in the guidelines that advise the police and YOTs what to consider when 
deciding upon the most appropriate out-of-court disposal (Ministry of Justice 2013: 16–17).  It is 
thus not surprising that the inspections of desistance and out-of-court disposals found that actual 
knowledge of desistance theory was limited among practitioners and not embedded fully into 
their work (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection 2017; HMI Probation 2016). Therefore, in practice, 
it seems that the RFPP and desistance thinking were conflated, such that a toxic mix of needs and 
deeds prevailed, and young people’s welfare needs remained individualized, medicalized, 
pathologized and dematerialized with a heavy emphasis on linking risk of offending with 
deficiencies in mental health, educational attainment and communication skills (Taylor 2016).  
Meanwhile, the structural constraints that block young people’s pathways out of crime are 
minimized because, while both the RFPP and desistance theory recognize the social context of 
offending, they seek solutions through correcting “individual” deficits and/or building 
“individual” strengths.   
 
The Therapeutization of “Effective Practice”  
 What is constituted as “effective practice” in the current diversionary climate?  Drawing on the 
research of McAra and McVie (2010), the “effective practice” guidelines stress the value of 
diverting young people from formal processing by the criminal justice system for low level 
offending because it supports positive social development and avoids criminalization (Youth 
9 
 
Justice Board 2016b). The minimalist diversionary programs of the 1980s advocated radical non-
intervention (Smith 2014).  However, the newly rediscovered diversionary programs support 
intensive therapeutic interventions (Kelly and Armitage 2015).  The Youth Justice Board 
guidelines (2016b: 5) advise: “in working with young people using programmes, the evidence is 
that support should be therapeutic… aiming to respond to individual needs and risks, but also 
build on the strengths of the young person.” 
Hence, young people are not abandoned but diverted into individually tailored therapeutic 
services to address educational, mental health, social skill, and substance misuse difficulties 
(Youth Justice Board 2017).  Some of these services, such as mental health counselling, are 
universally available to all children, but increasingly with the cuts in public spending, they are 
targeted at those presenting the greatest needs and risks (Turnbull 2016).  This is evidenced by 
the recent Ministry of Justice and Youth Justice Board (2017) audit of youth crime prevention 
initiatives, which found that 89% of YOTs were involved in the delivery of a wide range of such 
targeted interventions.8  The inspection of out-of-court disposals (Criminal Justice Joint 
Inspection 2017: 14) found similarly that a substantial proportion of YOTs’ interventions 
centered on the provision of therapeutic diversionary support and so concluded that, “in view of 
the importance of this work,” it would be included “in its next programme of performance 
inspections of youth offending work.” 
 Apart from therapeutic interventions, restorative approaches are also popular and are a 
key element of several diversionary programs (Ministry of Justice 2013: 10). Restorative 
practices, however, are open to the same type of criticisms as desistance interventions because of 
the way they focus on individual change by confronting young people with the consequences of 
their offending while bypassing the effects of broader social constraints (Cunneen and Goldson 
2015; Gray 2005).  Interestingly, while the use of restorative justice is promoted heavily in 
diversionary programs, the inspection report on desistance (HMI Probation 2016: 35) was highly 
critical of the way in which it is delivered, arguing “that overall restorative work was delivered 
effectively in less than one-third of cases.”  
 The overriding theme that permeates all the official rhetoric on “effective practice” in 
diversionary programs, however, was that of “engagement”—or ensuring that young people 
                                                          
8 This survey defined “prevention” both as “diversion from offending for those on the cusp” and “‘targeted’ 
diversion from the youth justice system for low level offending.” 
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participate actively in the change process.  This is illustrated by the “effective practice” 
guidelines (Youth Justice Board 2016b: 1), which state: “To affect real change and prevent 
reoffending, working with young people requires more than their passive attendance at 
appointments….to be effective these (programmes) require the young person to be engaged, able 
and motivated to change.”  It would appear that through this emphasis on engagement, the 
constitution of “effective” interventions remains faithful to the neoliberal creed of 
responsibilization by motivating young people to take responsibility for transforming themselves 
into crime-free and conforming citizens (see Phoenix and Kelly 2013). 
 
            Delivering Diversion 
The era of what Cunneen, Goldson and Russell (2017: 4) describe as “penal moderation” has 
been marked not only by a dramatic increase in the numbers and types of diversionary programs, 
but also by changes in the way such programs are delivered.  Gray (2013: 518) argues that YOTs 
can be theorized as “assemblages of penal governance in action” and, in recent years, these 
assemblages have been forced to undergo significant remodeling to accommodate the cuts in 
public spending and the shifts in the problematization and management of need and risk, outlined 
above.9   
Recently, we completed research on changes in the design and structure of YOTs, where 
we found that three main service delivery models had emerged, which we described as “offender 
management,” “targeted intervention,” and “children and young people first” (Smith and Gray 
2018).  These models should be regarded as “ideal types” and conceptualized loosely, as no YOT 
was devoted completely to any one model to the total exclusion of the other two.  Each model, 
however, interpreted how diversionary programs10 should be delivered, based on their underlying 
principles and modus operandi, rather than in relation to the research evidence on the 
criminalizing effects of entry into the formal youth justice system (Bateman 2017; Smith 2017). 
 “Offender management” teams adopt a managerialist approach to young people who 
offend, which, in the context of out-of-court disposals, focuses on preventing the likelihood of 
further offending to forestall entry into the formal youth justice system.  Such teams continue to 
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draw heavily on the routinized elements of formal processes where, for example, standardized 
risk-based models of assessment are still more easily applied, despite the official support in 
Asset Plus for a positive, strength based problematization of risk and need inspired by desistance 
theory (see McNeill 2018).  This means that young people’s welfare needs remain of relevance 
only to the extent that they act as indicators for intervention, as need and risk of offending 
continue to be conflated.  While many of these teams have developed partnerships with a range 
of social welfare providers to address needs, they remain in thrall to a risk-oriented, 
problematizing mindset that individualizes and pathologizes the problems of young people who 
offend. So, for example, educational underachievement is seen to reflect individual deficits in 
young offenders’ personalities rather than having any association with the decline in educational 
resources arising from cuts in public spending. The principal drivers of “offender management” 
teams are compliance with formal expectations, standardized measures of performance, and 
defensible practice. These team will take an essentially procedural approach to diversion: “young 
offenders are assessed and, where possible, referred on to alternative interventions at the point of 
arrest, in order to divert low-risk or first-time offenders away from the justice system” (Morris 
2016: 10). The content of such interventions is of little or no concern from an “offender 
management” perspective. 
 On the other hand, while the work of “targeted intervention” teams is likewise centered 
on addressing the risks associated with young people’s offending, they nonetheless think more 
holistically and proactively about the interrelationship between youth crime and young people’s 
underlying problems.  These problems will form the focal point for intervention. “Risk from” 
and “risk to” young people are likely to be conflated, and these teams tend to adopt a more 
interventionist approach, even in the more restricted domain of out-of-court work. They may be 
located in the same premises and intervene collaboratively with a wider set of other youth 
support services that target different aspects of young people’s social welfare problems, 
including family conflict, poor educational attainment, and substance misuse.  While retaining an 
interest in the RFPP, targeted intervention teams may subscribe to desistance thinking and thus 
devote greater attention to building young people’s strengths rather than dwelling on their 
deficits. A typical “targeted” diversion program is described as being “designed to provide 
beneficial outcomes for young people, address underlying offending behaviour, as well as aiming 
to reduce incurred service and Criminal Justice System costs” (Tyrell et al. 2017: 5). The focus 
12 
 
of intervention is principally on offending behavior and its scope is clearly circumscribed by the 
restricted spending framework that prevails currently. 
 “Children and young people first” (CYPF) teams11 view themselves as pursuing a 
distinctly different, “child-friendly” and progressive approach to young people who offend, 
which is guided explicitly by the 1989 United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child.  
Young people who engage in crime are seen essentially as children whose problems are viewed 
holistically, such that the dynamic interaction between the psychological and the social are given 
prominence.  Diverting young people who offend from the formal youth justice system to avoid 
criminalization and stigmatization is prioritized and is accompanied by inclusionary type 
interventions that support them to access the mainstream, universal social services to which all 
children are entitled.  Overall, CYPF teams aim to provide holistic, integrated, universal support 
to meet all the complex social problems that young people who offend frequently face. A typical 
“children first” diversionary program (see Byrne and Case 2016) is the one run by the Surrey 
Youth Support Team (now part of Surrey Family Services). Such a program aims to support 
vulnerable young people to make a smooth transition to adulthood by focusing intervention on 
their welfare problems, including the circumstances surrounding their offending, without further 
contact with the criminal justice system. Much emphasis is placed on restorative style 
interventions, which seek to restore young people’s relationship with family and the wider 
community as well as repairing harm to victims. 
 
Neoliberal Youth Penality in Action 
For each of the above models to be able to find its place in the broader framework of acceptable 
and justifiable forms of practice within the current ethos of neoliberal governance, we must find 
and articulate some common strands of justificatory logic. This can both be called upon to 
support ostensibly very different approaches and, at the same time, demonstrate a degree of 
coherence and consistency with the wider social context. The “diversionary impulse” can be 
likened to a jigsaw puzzle held together by three core dynamics—the rediscovery of welfare 
thinking, the therapeutization of “effective practice,” and the appearance of new modes of 
delivery.  So, what do these dynamics tell us about the complexities of neoliberal youth penality 
in action?  First, the style of regulation has changed.  Second, the state remains sovereign despite 
                                                          
11 The “positive youth justice” movement (see Haines and Case 2015) informs these teams. 
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circumstantial evidence to the contrary. Finally, racialized bifurcation is at play because while 
regulatory strategies have become more benign for some young people who offend, for others, 
they remain as punitive as ever. 
 
Therapeutic penal governance 
Earlier in this article, we discussed how most young people in England and Wales who offend 
end up on informal (e.g., triage) or formal (e.g., out-of-court disposals).  On the surface, the 
significant increase in diversionary measures appears to be very progressive (Bateman 2017).  It 
seems to suggest that lessons have been learnt from the research evidence on the dangers of 
criminalization arising from contact with the youth justice system (McAra and McVie 2010).  As 
Moore (2011) argues, however, in relation to the specialized treatment courts in Canada and the 
US, beneath the progressive veneer lurk more insidious forms of social control. Diversionary 
programs do not divert young people who offend away from the “criminological gaze” (McAra 
2017a: 784).  Instead, they are diverted into a range of therapeutic style welfare interventions 
comprising varying degrees of intensity that act as smokescreens for more refined, subtle and 
invisible forms of surveillance and social regulation (Kelly and Armitage 2015).  Therapeutic 
penal governance also expands the range of disposals available to watch over “problematic” 
young people before resorting to more expensive punitive sanctions.  In one sense, 
interventionist diversion has taken Cohen’s (1985) fishing net metaphor of “net widening” and 
“mesh strengthening” to a more sophisticated plane. 
 Therapeutic penal governance individualizes and dematerializes the welfare difficulties 
faced by young people who offend (Turnbull 2016).  Such young people are expected to take 
personal responsibility to negotiate their own needs and risks, while the structural constraints that 
restrict their choices are overlooked.  As Goshe (2015: 43) argues in the context of the US, the 
therapeutic turn in penal governance “fosters ‘blindness’ to the structural and material causes of 
social problems.”  Reductions in public expenditure as part of the neoliberal economic project 
have further reinforced the negative effects of structural disadvantage (Cooper and Whyte 2017) 
because the “rediscovery of welfare” has not been backed up by increased financial support and 
so the welfare needs of young people continue to be neglected (Bateman 2017).  This has led to 
severe condemnation from the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (2016) 
because of the way cuts in welfare spending have had a disproportionately unjust and unfair 
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impact on children from the poorest socio-economic backgrounds—that is those who are most 
likely to find themselves in contact with the youth justice system.  The failure to address 
structural issues leads McAra (2017a: 784) to conclude that whatever principles the youth justice 
system pursues, the result for young people is that it is simply an assemblage for disciplining and 
regulating marginality, which “reinforces class distinctions” and racial divisions, and “places 
socio-economic differentiation at the heart of governance.” 
 Despite the austerity measures, diversionary programs as new sites of penal governance 
mimic the activities of the therapeutic courts in Canada and the US, referred to earlier by 
providing young people with welfare support to engage and comply with out-of-court-disposals 
(Moore 2011).  In the neoliberal era, however, desistance discourses have turned upside down 
the way in which compliance is understood and measured at these new sites of power, taking 
Foucault’s (1977) analytic insights into the disciplinary attributes of the “normalising gaze” and 
Rose’s (2000) notion of the self-regulation of conduct through “circuits of inclusion” to new 
levels of sophistication. The diversion process is now couched in a language of responsible self-
governance, which seeks to build on young people’s achievements rather than to address their 
deficits.  As Liebenberg and colleagues (2015: 1013) found in their research: “Front line workers 
used compliance as a means of measuring youth responsibilisation. In other words, compliance 
was seen as the youth’s acceptance of responsibility, and was used as a measure for continued 
support by the system.”  Not being seen to accept responsibility for making changes in their 
lives, in terms of visible indicators of compliance, such as “active” engagement with change 
programs, could have significant consequences for young people as it was used to justify the 
withdrawal of therapeutic support. 
 
Governance at a Distance 
Governmentality theorists argue that in the present neoliberal era, the political power of the state 
has been diffused to a myriad network of interrelated microsites that facilitate “governing at a 
distance” (Rose and Miller 1992: 173; see also Hughes 2007).  Donzelot (1979), too, has 
suggested that the state and ruling interests have developed sophisticated modes of transmission 
of the messages and techniques of control via the seemingly mundane and natural structures of 
everyday life, including the family, in particular. On the surface, the “diversionary impulse” 
appears to suggest withdrawal of direct state regulation in the youth justice arena and its 
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substitution, by other means, of indirect and informal regulatory control of problematic groups 
and individuals.  While the moral imperatives that determine the framework for judging 
acceptable and unacceptable behavior have not changed, the processes by which desired 
outcomes are promoted and secured have been subject to significant modification. The dynamics 
of this kind of process are perhaps revealed in the way the Youth Justice Board has slackened its 
grip over YOTs through the relaxation of performance targets, cutting back on government 
funding and allowing greater flexibility in how diversionary programs are delivered at the local 
level (see Bateman 2017).  This is too simplistic an analysis of what is happening, however.  
Instead, state-centered criminologists argue that while the state may exercise power through 
“networked” governance, it “retains an anchoring role in the provision of security” (Crawford 
2006: 471).  We need also to maintain an acute awareness of the consequences of this kind of 
strategy for those who are left—disproportionately drawn from black communities and beset 
increasingly with assumptions of intractability and inescapable labels. The debate between 
“networked governance” and the “anchoring” role of the state is played out in two key areas of 
youth justice. 
 First, while the Youth Justice Board has encouraged the flexibilization and localization of 
diversionary initiatives, it has not relinquished all its regulatory control over YOTs (see Youth 
Justice Board 2018).  During the assessment process, all YOTs are still expected to make use of 
Asset Plus which, while it has rejected the worst excesses of risk thinking, still legitimates a 
therapeutic dematerializing orientation to the problematization of young people who offend (see 
Youth Justice Board 2016a).  In 2016, this was accompanied by the setting up of the “effective 
practice hub” by the Youth Justice Board (see https://yjresourcehub.uk/) where, what are 
considered “gold standard” intervention programs, are extensively promoted.  Also, while 
performance targets have been reduced substantially, they have not been totally swept away, so 
YOTs remain subject to inspections that, themselves, are ideologically driven and influential 
(Hampson 2018).   
 Second, the government response (Ministry of Justice 2016) to Taylor’s (2016) Review of 
the youth justice system in England and Wales makes it quite clear who is in “command and 
control…. within the contemporary social regulation armoury” (Crawford 2006: 471).  Taylor 
(2016) suggested some innovative and far-reaching changes to youth justice, which were 
underpinned by a holistic welfare orientated approach not unlike the CYPF model discussed 
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earlier.  He also advocated even greater flexibility and devolution in the delivery of diversionary 
schemes, such that YOTs would have been integrated completely into wider local authority 
children and youth services.  While the government in their response accepted in principle the 
gist of Taylor’s “child friendly” suggestions, it reiterated that young people “who commit crimes 
must face the consequences of their actions” and that youth justice is about managing their risk 
of offending (Ministry of Justice 2016: 3).  The Youth Justice Board was expected to continue to 
robustly monitor YOT standards and performance, and youth custody was to remain a crucial 
component of the youth justice system.  Indeed, this latter issue was seen to be so important that 
youth custody was taken out of the remit of the Youth Justice Board and established as a new 
distinct arm of HM Prison and Probation Service under the centralized umbrella of the Ministry 
of Justice. 
 
Bifurcatory, Racialized Governance 
Strikingly, in taking its position on arguments for reform, the government has paid little attention 
to a crucial feature of the contemporary youth justice system. Neoliberal youth penality is 
simultaneously bifurcatory and racialized (see Miller and Stuart 2017).  While in recent years, as 
noted earlier, the rate of youth custody in England and Wales has been falling,12 it is still not 
being used as a “last resort,” as pointed out by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of 
the Child (2016). Indeed for those young people constituted as “high risk,” it remains the core 
punitive sanction (Bateman 2017).  Therapeutic penal governance is considered to be acceptable 
only for low-level offenders.  The continued central importance of imprisonment for serious and 
persistent offending in the compendium of penal-welfare youth justice measures was evidenced 
by the government response to Taylor’s (2016) review. This recommended that to ensure the 
punitive credentials of custody are maintained, it be taken out of the hands of the Youth Justice 
Board to become a special arm of HM Prison and Probation Service (Ministry of Justice 2016). 
Goshe (2015: 42) similarly points out that the drop in arrests and imprisonment in the US looks 
as if “a new era of progressive reform” has dawned, but in reality, these changes only skim the 
surface as “harshly punitive practices remain” with the rate of youth custody continuing to 
exceed that in most other western countries (Goshe 2018: 2). At the same time—and at the other 
                                                          
12 Although it is once again rising, it is too early to surmise whether this is a stable trend (Bateman 2017). 
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end of the scale—we should also remain cognizant of the evidence that even where young people 
are “diverted” from the justice system, they are likely to retain “markers” which identify them as 
problematic and risky, and covertly impose a series of disadvantages which cannot be side-
stepped easily. As Miller and Stuart (2017: 537) argue (see also Selman, Myers and Goddard in 
this issue): “a criminal record, even when charges are dropped, marks the conventional citizen as 
“criminal” making their presumed criminality legible to the people they encounter in everyday 
life.” 
 Despite the inroads made by strength-based desistance approaches, problematizing and 
risk-oriented rationalities and technologies remain popular in youth justice policy and practice in 
England and Wales (Turnbull 2016).  This is evidenced by our earlier discussion of Asset Plus, 
“effective practice,” and the government response to the Taylor (2016) review (Ministry of 
Justice 2016).  Risk logic supports bifurcatory governance by classifying offenders into low and 
high risk categories with therapeutic interventions legitimated for the former and more punitive 
custodial options reserved for the latter (Goshe 2015).  Risk talk, however, not only justifies 
bifurcatory governance, it also exacerbates the ‘othering’ of some groups of young people 
particularly those from black and minority ethnic backgrounds.  
Racial stereotypes are embedded into penal practices and risk technologies, such as Asset 
(Hannah-Moffat and Maurutto 2010).  This means that young black people who have 
experienced high levels of socio-economic disadvantage are more likely to be assessed as 
exceptionally “needy” and “risky,” and to be criminalized, even at the point of initial contact 
with the justice system (Uhrig 2016), which speeds up their route to custody (Webster 2018). 
This is because as Goddard and Myers (2017: 157) argue: “rather than measuring innate qualities 
“inside” a young person, risk instruments transform negative life events that occur 
disproportionately in poor communities of color into an elevated risk score.” 
 The Lammy Review (2017: 4) into race disparities in the criminal justice system across 
England and Wales provided evidence of the extent of over-representation of black youth. 
Contrary to their white counterparts, at the “front end,” the proportion of young black people 
entering the youth justice system for the first time has risen from 11% to 19% and at the “back 
end,” the proportion receiving a custodial disposal rose from 25% to 41% between 2006 and 
2016. Similarly, in the US Goddard and Myers (2018) show how young black people are 
disproportionately arrested, charged and sentenced to custody. Earlier in this article, we 
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criticized Wacquant (2009) for his failure to appreciate the subtleties of neoliberal youth 
penality.  Nevertheless, his analysis of the “punitive turn” and how high levels of imprisonment 
has been used to manage and control marginalized and disadvantaged outcasts from the 
neoliberal economic project does seem to ring particularly true for black youth caught up in the 
youth justice system. 
 
Conclusion: What would a Progressive Vision of Diversion Look Like? 
So far we have provided a somewhat dystopian account of the “diversionary impulse” (Garland 
2018). Against this rather depressing backdrop, however, we might reasonably ask just what the 
prospects for progressive change are, as opposed to a mere reordering and reframing of the logic 
and machinery of control, amidst an escalating program of withdrawal of services and support 
mechanisms which might have benefited children who become known to the justice system. 
Youth justice is a messy business, in which policy makers and practitioners are involved actively 
in interpreting how the “needs” and “risks” of young people who offend should be understood 
and what should represent “effective” interventions to address them. This process offers 
considerable opportunities for challenge, negotiation, and resistance (see Prior and Barnes 2011). 
As indicated earlier, the alternative rationales-in-action that we have identified previously (Smith 
and Gray 2018) can be viewed, on the one hand, as locked irretrievably into the ethos and logic 
of the justice system which is, in turn, inevitably geared towards problematizing and “working 
on” those identified as problematic children. On the other hand, critical analysts and practitioners 
have continued to set out and advocate for the positive and even transformative potential of 
child-centered and rights-oriented forms of intervention. The most prominent of these in the UK 
at this point is perhaps the “positive youth justice” model (Haines and Case 2015), which guides 
the “children and young people first” (CYPF) teams we described previously.  
 Goddard and Myers (2018) present an inspirational account of how twelve community-
based projects in the US strive to achieve social justice for disadvantaged youth through 
grassroots activism.  Such efforts, however, are undermined constantly by being forced to follow 
risk management targets set by the neoliberal state.  These are difficult to subvert as they are 
monitored closely through performance audits and funding controls.  Nevertheless, Goddard and 
Myers (2018) argue “there are cracks in neoliberal governance” which the “social justice 
organizations constantly exploit.”  While CYPF agencies in England and Wales are public 
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bodies, parallels can be drawn with the privatized organizations referred to by Goddard and 
Myers in the US.  The key question then is: To what extent do CYPF agencies who claim to 
adopt a progressive approach to young people who offend offer real possibilities for 
transformative social justice through their diversionary interventions? 
CYPF teams see young people in conflict with the law as being essentially children who 
have the same welfare and developmental needs as all children.  This problematization is non-
criminalizing as it does not conflate “need” with “risk” of offending and so recognizes that 
young people have wider vulnerabilities beyond offending that must be addressed.  Such teams 
focus their assessments on the “whole child” and, in this process, the effects of social 
disadvantage and structural disadvantage are acknowledged along with more individual issues.  
In CYPF teams, “effective” interventions are planned around building young people’s strengths 
and resilience rather than tackling deficits and pathologies.  This constructive approach to 
“effective” practice is reinforced by the importance placed on diverting young people who 
offend away from the pernicious effects of contact with the criminal justice system into more 
inclusionary social welfare provision that should be universally available to all “troubled” 
children. 
 CYPF agencies undoubtedly provide a positive and benevolent experience of youth 
justice.  Unfortunately, it is poverty not crime that heightens young people’s chances of falling 
under the criminalizing remit of the youth justice system and, as McAra (2017b: 962) points out, 
not enough is being done to protect the wellbeing of the child by “tackling poverty and 
promoting a wide social justice agenda.”  From a social justice perspective, CYPF teams could 
therefore be criticized for implicitly accepting the definition of young people as “the problem.” 
At the same time, they could be accused of providing a narrow, process-led approach to 
diversion because they do not have the authority or capacity to challenge either the social 
disadvantages of the young people with whom they work or the criminalizing logic of the justice 
system itself.  Overall, to make use of Goddard and Myers’ (2018: 137) analogy, CYPF teams in 
England and Wales perform mainly “lifeguarding duties” by reducing the damage of exposure to 
the youth justice system and improving access to welfare support services. Unlike their 
counterparts in the US, they are not ambitious enough “to look upstream” to tackle “the 
structural inequalities and unequal power dynamics at the root of crime and criminalization.” 
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  The logic of engaged critical practice thus points towards four key qualities that are 
essential attributes of progressive and transformative interventions: 
- They must be unequivocally rights-based—that is, the unquestioned guarantee of 
children’s rights must be met as a precondition of intervention. 
- Systemic inequalities, especially those grounded in ethnic differences, must be 
challenged at every point, rather than incorporated into practice; there is no neutral 
position whereby embedded unfairnesses are simply “passported” into the next phase of 
intervention. 
- All forms of practice must be geared towards “inclusion,” whether in community 
activities, education, generic health provision, or access to universal benefits. 
- And, finally, none of this can be achieved without adopting a fully-fledged participatory 
approach to young people’s part in criminal justice practices. 
This way, perhaps, lies the true “spirit of diversion.” We could expect certain consequences to 
follow from an unequivocal commitment to these principles, including a de-racialization of 
youth justice.  Alongside this, we could also envision a progressive trend towards “acceptance” 
of young people who previously, and even with the best will in the world, have been defined 
only by what makes them different or divergent from the norm. Undoubtedly much work lies 
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